18 octubre 2016

Si quieres que te mande los emails diarios, me los pides. Abrazos,

expectativas de rendimientos para los próximos 5 años

Desde Robeco:
Pero solo en esos actives con mayor volatilidad…
Every year Robeco takes a fresh look at the outlook for the global economy over the next five years. Our analysis gives a prognosis for the major asset classes and three potential scenarios (baseline, stagnation and high growth).
+ Hopes of monetary policy returning to normal in 2016 were shattered
+ Sentiment among professional investors is extremely weak
+ We continue to believe a gradual normalization is the most likely scenario
In December 2015, when we first set out to discuss this year’s edition of our annual Expected Returns publication, we were in good spirits. The European economy had surprised everybody by growing above trend, the global economy was picking up and the Fed’s first interest-rate hike had not derailed markets as many had feared. The process of monetary normalization was all set to begin.
Sure, there were issues; there always are. The ongoing decline in the oil price; positive for consumers, perhaps, but worrying for financial markets. A growing consensus among economists that increasingly high debt levels could lead to an adverse debt cycle. And the meltdown in emerging markets with the Brazilian and Russian economies shrinking significantly (by 3.8% and 3.7% respectively in 2015), plus a Chinese growth path that was looking increasingly unsustainable. But it was nothing we couldn’t handle.
Black clouds
Eight months on and our spirits are not in such good shape. The hoped for normalization evaporated after a solitary rate hike by the Fed. Falling oil prices have hit the positive impetus driving the US economy and the outlook has become more uncertain. External factors have also curbed the Fed’s desire to hike rates: uncertainty about China, financial market volatility and a major negative blow in the form of the Brexit vote. This shattered any hopes of monetary policy returning to normal, causing the UK to follow in the footsteps of the ECB and Bank of Japan and start quantitative easing. So unless we now regard QE as the new normal, it is clear that 2016 is not set to become the year of monetary normalization.
Is this just another temporary setback, or should we succumb to one of the numerous credible doom scenarios: disintegration of the European economy (Brexit, the rise of populist parties, Italian banks), Chinese hard landing (unsuccessful rebalancing of the Chinese economy, high debt), rise in protectionism (the Trump factor), loss of central-bank credibility (Japan), and the bursting of the debt bubble. After all, we’re spoilt for choice.
It’s always darkest just before dawn
But are things really so bad? You could be forgiven for thinking they are. Our impression is that sentiment among professional investors has probably never been as weak as it is right now. This is corroborated by what the financial markets have priced in: average inflation expectations in the European market for the period 2021-2026 are as low as 1.25%. Looking at the West-German track record (renowned for its tough inflationary stance), such a five-year average is pretty rare. Possible? Sure. But likely? Well, only if you really are very pessimistic about the future. And this is exactly the point we want to make.
Pessimism is a risk in itself. There is plenty of self-reinforcing momentum in the way economies work, so a move in one direction is not easily reversed. Once growth weakens, producers and consumers become more cautious, investment, employment and consumption levels all contract, reinforcing the downward trend.
Stock markets normally hit bottom when things are at their bleakest. If earnings evaporate, companies collapse, people get fired and there is talk of ‘the end of capitalism as we know it’, that’s when the tide turns. The bad news may still continue, but the market has by then already discounted it. The bleaker the expectations, the better the odds that the surprise will be a positive one.
It’s always darkest just before dawn. And if the mood of investors is anything to go by, it is already pretty dark out there.
Baseline scenario
Despite just how tempting it is to succumb to this general feeling of pessimism, we continue to believe that a gradual normalization is the most likely scenario. Call us optimists if you like. One fact overlooked by many is that – despite low growth – labor markets have strengthened and unemployment rates in the leading economies are below their longer term averages. In this scenario, consumers with a disposable income boosted by oil price falls should play a central role. Mind you, given the underlying growth and inflation assumptions, we are not predicting anything spectacular: the global economy will grow by roughly 3%, inflation will reach an average of 2.5% for the world as a whole and 2% for the developed countries. But we are well aware of the risks in the current environment and the 60% likelihood we attach to our baseline scenario reflects this.
The table summarizes our forecast for the broader asset classes. We are not particularly positive on government bonds and have lowered our five-year expected return on AAA European government bonds to -3.5% (2015: -3.0%). Yields have dropped to even lower levels than last year, giving less of a buffer when adverse price movements occur. This -3.5% is, however, based on the German ten-year benchmark, which has almost the lowest yield out there. Our projections for the US indicate a -0.25% negative return (local currency), while peripheral European bonds also offer better value. We have increased our five-year target for developed market equities to 6.5% (2015: 5.5%), reflecting lower equity valuations worldwide.
Stagnation scenario
We have become more cautious and this is reflected in the increased likelihood we have given our stagnation scenario (from 20% to 30%). Here, we expect global economic growth to decline to 1.6%, half the level seen over the past five years. Some areas will be hit by recession, China will hit zero growth and then see a subdued recovery. Inflation will drop to an average of 1%, but would reach deflationary average levels without the contribution of emerging markets. The Western world will sink into a Japan-like scenario. Unlike the baseline, in this adverse growth scenario bonds remain the place to be, offering the only value for money.
High growth scenario
In our optimistic high growth scenario (10%), the US and the Eurozone economies expand rapidly, initially boosted by consumption and later by investment too. The global economy enters a virtuous circle and debt ratios fall. China successfully rebalances its economy and growth in Japan accelerates. Average real global economic growth will reach 3.5%. Perhaps not high compared to the 3.25% of the past five years, but if we take aging and the lower Chinese growth rate into account (6% compared to 8.5% in 2010-2015), it means growth will rise above its underlying potential. Inflation poses the main risk causing bonds to suffer and depressing stock performance somewhat, as wage and financing costs hurt margins.
Y para los mercados emergentes:
In the past two decades emerging markets have experienced bust, boom and lately a more stable phase. Not surprisingly, investors now wonder whether it is still worth investing in the region.
+ Earnings per share growth in emerging markets will edge up to 4.5%
+ Slightly higher dividend yields of around 3.25% in the next five years
+ We prefer a cautious overweight for emerging market stocks
High expectations in terms of returns have not been met in recent years by emerging markets, while volatility has remained elevated. This poor relative performance has led to significant outflows, causing emerging equities to become unloved, under-owned and cheap. Have we reached the end of this period of poor performance, or is there a good argument to part with emerging equities altogether?
Earnings growth will contribute again
What will happen in emerging countries in terms of productivity during the next five years? On the positive side, we think there will be a number of factors to support growth in the emerging economies. We expect the commodity markets to enter a new phase following the rout in commodity prices of the past two years. Global aggregate demand is expected to increase in our base scenario and the pickup from current subdued global trade levels should benefit emerging markets. Domestic consumption in emerging markets will contribute. Emerging market currencies are significantly undervalued and we expect this to feed into stronger earnings.
But there are also a number of serious headwinds. China and South Korea are maturing and are entering a phase of diminishing returns following earlier economic reform activities and capital accumulation. Commodity exports are expected to remain a dominant driver behind economic activity in emerging markets and a decline in the commodity intensity of global growth will also cap the upside for emerging market productivity gains. And emerging economies are lagging behind developed markets when it comes to rule of law, regulatory efficiency, fiscal freedom and market transparency.
In summary, although we do expect a stabilization in (cyclical) productivity growth, it is unlikely that growth will return to pre-financial crisis levels. This implies less upside for earnings from a productivity perspective.
Cyclical sources brighten earnings prospects
As productivity is unlikely to rebound to previous levels, what can we expect for earnings from a cyclical perspective? Although we are somewhat more positive here, one hurdle is the oil price. The US is now a shale oil producer and marginal supplier, and China is making a shift towards becoming a more service-oriented economy. This means we don’t expect the windfall for emerging market commodity exports which we have seen in the past.
Having said that, margins are not particularly high in emerging markets. The profit cycle has room to improve significantly as emerging markets start to benefit from the improved competitiveness resulting from the strong depreciation of most of their currencies. All in all, we expect earnings per share growth in emerging markets to edge up to 4.5%.
“A cautious stance is warranted for emerging markets”
Repricing – reviewing the valuation argument
One of the main reasons for optimism in the case for investing in emerging markets today is that they are cheap. On the face of it, the MSCI Emerging Markets Index shows a discount of 25% on a standard price to earnings (P/E) basis compared to the global benchmark. This observation is a powerful plus point for emerging markets, as low valuations bode well for outperformance relative to developed markets in the next five years.
However, despite this optimism on valuations, we must examine whether the current deep discount in emerging markets is largely due to excessive investor pessimism or whether stocks are cheap for a reason with the discount merely reflecting underlying macro risks?
Recently observed macro risks such as the rout in the commodity markets, strong US dollar appreciation and slowing Chinese growth could all be viable explanations for this significant discount. Our research shows that the market has in particular priced in a ‘China factor’ as a systematic risk and this has, in part, shaped the emerging valuation discount since 2011, when the landing phase in China became apparent.
Dividend yield remains stable factor
The return component that has become increasingly attractive during the landing phase is the dividend yield. This is 3.0% for the MSCI EM Index, 20 basis points above the current dividend yield of the MSCI AC World Index. This dividend yield differential corresponds with the average seen over the past 20 years. The dividend yield depends on earnings (which we do expect to pick up from current levels), payout ratios and stock prices. Payout ratios are not fixed and are largely a function of corporate capital expenditure. We think overall capex in emerging markets is lower when commodity markets enter an exploitation phase. This raises the payout ratio in conjunction with a somewhat higher expected earnings yield. Adding both these forces together, we expect slightly higher dividend yields of around 3.25% in the next five years.
Emerging markets relatively attractive
Are emerging markets the ‘grain which will grow’ in the next five years? Our analyses suggest that a cautious stance is warranted. We do not expect multiple expansion over the next five years and expect the discount of emerging markets relative to developed markets to increase further as uncertainty about China sets in. We do expect an improvement in corporate profitability compared to developed markets, but with the emphasis on earnings growth, returns will probably be highly volatile. However, we also observe that the return prospects for developed market investors are brighter as emerging market currencies are expected to appreciate against developed market currencies. Overall, we prefer a cautious overweight for emerging market stocks relative to their developed market counterparts.
Expected five-year returns for emerging market equities
PD1: Interesante esta tabla que muestra los rendimientos reales dependiendo de cada tipo de activo. Aunque nunca hemos tenido unos rendimientos negativos en bonos, por culpa de la política monetaria super expansiva, como hasta ahora…
PD2: “Tener hijos no lo convierte a uno en padre, del mismo modo en que tener un piano no lo vuelve pianista”, lo dijo un tal Michael Levine, que no tengo ni idea quién es. Pero es una gran verdad. ¡Ay de esos padres que no hacen caso de sus hijos, que no se involucran, que lo tienen todo delegado en la madre, so pretexto de no tener tiempo para nada, que llegan demasiado cansados del trabajo, que no van a ver a los profesores en las tutorías, que les compran su cariño con tonterías, que se excusan ante sus hijos y les tratan de compensar con media hora el fin de semana…, ay!!!
Hace años, en mi niñez, los padres llegaban a casa y pedían un whisky; ahora llegan más tarde a casa para evitar hacer lo que otros muchos hacen, los baños, la cena, los deberes…, ufff, qué pereza les da!!!
Ánimo, se puede, se debe educar a los hijos con nuestro tiempo, se debe encontrar tiempo de calidad, no seamos rácanos…, y sin tener el móvil encendido, por favor!!!

17 octubre 2016

los datos de la recuperación económica española

No tiene tan buena pinta. Pese a estar creciendo a un 3% el PIB español, y generar muchos puestos de trabajo, el 91% de los españoles piensa que la economía va mal:

Poniendo números a la recuperación

¿Cuánto se ha recuperado la economía española? En este artículo respondemos a esa pregunta
Sabemos que la economía española se está recuperando, incluso hace poco el Banco de España nos informó de que ya estamos muy cerca de alcanzar el mismo nivel que antes de la crisis. Por ello vamos a poner números a varios indicadoresque según el Ministerio de Economía son los que mejor toman el pulso al consumo y a la inversión, tanto en industria como en construcción.
Empezando con las ventas en consumo de las grandes empresas, que es el indicador que mejor correlaciona con el consumo en la economía española, vemos que se tocó fondo en 2013, con un descenso del 23% respecto a 2013. Con los últimos datos de 2016 la caída es todavía del 14,3%.
Las matriculaciones de automóviles es otro indicador que correlaciona muy bien con el consumo. En este caso vemos cómo la recuperación es aún menor, ya que desde un pico de 140.000 vehículos en 2007 ahora estamos sobre los 90.000, es decir, que si bien es una subida considerable desde los mínimos de 60.000 automóviles de 2012, aún estamos hablando de descensos del 36%.
Un tercer indicador que según el Mº de Economía correlaciona muy bien con el consumo son las disponibilidades interiores de manufacturas de consumo (que viene a ser el consumo interior de las manufacturas que no son bienes de inversión, por ejemplo el móvil que posiblemente esté Vd. usando para leer este artículo). En este caso se tocó fondo también en 2013 con un descenso del 31%. Actualmente la caída todavía está en el 20%.
El cuarto y último indicador que usaremos es el índice de comercio al por menor deflactado. En este caso poco hay que explicar pues es obvio que forzosamente ha de correlacionar bien con el consumo. En este caso se tocó fondo a principios de 2014 con una caída del 28% respecto a máximos. Actualmente la recuperación deja este descenso en el 22%.
Como vemos y a pesar de lo que diga el Banco de España el consumo está lejísimos de recuperar los niveles previos a la crisis, y a este paso harán falta al menos ocho años más para ello. Aunque es absurdo pensar que no va a haber una nueva crisis antes de ocho años, por lo que con seguridad tardaremos mucho más, si es que alguna vez se llegan a alcanzar los niveles de consumo de 2007.
Si vamos a la inversión fuera de la construcción el primer indicador que el Mº de Economía nos recomienda mirar son las disponibilidades de bienes de equipo. En este caso vemos cómo la inversión alcanzó un máximo de 146 en 2007, tocando mínimos en 2013 en 75, es decir, un desplome del 49%. Desde entonces se ha recuperado hasta 97, luego a día de hoy todavía es un 34% más baja que antes de empezar la crisis.
El otro indicador que cita el Mº de Economía son las matriculaciones de vehículos de carga, que tocó fondo en 2013 con un 74% de descenso. En los ocho meses disponibles de 2016 el descenso queda en el 36%.
Ambos indicadores como se ve son muy homogéneos y apuntan a que la inversión fuera de la construcción es actualmente un 35% más baja que en 2007.
Respecto a la construcción tenemos tres indicadores. El primero son los afiliados en construcción. En este caso la caída llegó al 64% y actualmente está en el 60%. La recuperación como se ve ha sido mínima.
El segundo es el consumo de cemento, en el que se ve la misma recuperación mínima que en la afiliación. Se tocó mínimos con descensos del 81% y actualmente esa caída está en el 78%.
El último indicador que usaremos para evaluar la evolución de la construcción es la superficie de visados de obra nueva. Se ve exactamente lo mismo, con un mínimo en 2013 con descensos del 93% que ahora está en el 89%.
Por lo tanto se ve que tanto en consumo como en inversión en equipo nos hallamos lejísimos de habernos recuperado, y en construcción la recuperación ha sido testimonial. La situación a pie de calle es por tanto mucho peor que en 2007 y los anuncios de que se ha recuperado el PIB anterior a la crisis inducen a confusión y se pueden calificar de pura propaganda política. El Banco de España se autocalifica entrando en este juego como un mero instrumento al servicio de los partidos y pierde totalmente el poco prestigio que le podía quedar después de la lamentable gestión de la burbuja inmobiliaria y de la crisis financiera subsiguiente.
PD1: Los errores del cálculo del déficit público por los ministros de economía y hacienda españoles son sistemáticos:
Ahora va a ocurrir de nuevo, salvo contabilidad creativa (ese adelanto con su devolución después, del impuesto de sociedades, que nos va a salvar en 8000 millones de euros de mayor déficit…
PD2: Y Fitch dijo que nos mantenía el rating sin subir, que lo dejaba en BBB+, por culpa de la subida continua de la deuda, del alto paro y de las tensiones políticas y catalanas… Somos de lo peorcito de Europa:
La semana pasada se publicó el tamaño de las mayores economías del mundo, donde hemos pasado en pocos años de ser la octava a ser la decimocuarta sin muchas posibilidades de mejorar… Nos adelantan sin freno otros que van mejor…
PD3: Y más datos que no confirma nuestra buena salud:
Parece bueno:
Pero si le haces zoom ya no lo es tanto:
Y las ventas minoristas:
Hasta Portugal anda mejor que nosotros…
Con su desglose:
Nuestra tasa de ahorro es muy baja. Se necesita ahorro para invertir. Si no se ahorra no se invierte. Y no, estamos ahorrando muy poco…
Si colocamos a mucha más gente, el mercado de trabajo está volviendo, pero en unas condiciones desastrosas:
Según el Banco de España, las expectativas para los próximos años son de menos crecimiento:
PD4: La familia, los amigos de toda la vida, los buenos compañeros de trabajo, los que te hablan de Dios, los que quieren lo mejor para ti. Si haces un repaso, son muy pocos; los demás pasan de ti, se aprovechan de ti, te usan, no se preocupan por ti…

14 octubre 2016

Se acabó la fiesta...

Hay una enorme sensación de que el mercado estadounidense no puede escalar más… Y sin embargo, falta el coletazo de la victoria electoral de uno de los dos candidatos que se enfrentan…: dicen que si gana Clinton, que es lo que el mercado espera, las bolsas subirían un tramo… Lo malo es que, últimamente, no suelen acertar las encuestas políticas.
Diferentes políticas entre los candidatos, según el Deutsche Bank:
Y los agoreros yanquis no hacen más que hablar del riesgo del inicio de la Tercera Guerra Mundial, empezada contra Rusia… Con tantas noticias negativas que ha habido sobre la situación macro de EEUU, más la esperada subida de tipos de interés de diciembre, el que no haya cedido apenas Wall Street, es un síntoma de fortaleza, o de que no se sabe dónde poner el dinero, no se sabe dónde invertir…
Over the past several years, there have been two primary sources of upside for the stock market: trillions in corporate buybacks, as companies themselves engaged in record repurchases of their own stock, often at price indiscriminate levels in a bid to not only raise the stock price but also the stock-linked compensation of management , and a similar amount of dividend payments which in a time of negligible yields, became one of the main drivers for buyers to scramble into the "safety" of dividend paying stocks. Collectively these account for an unprecedented amount of payouts to shareholders.
Today, Barclays' head of equity strategy Jonathan Glionna quantifies just how much corporate cash flow has and will be used to fund these payouts.
Glionna finds that in aggregate the companies within the S&P 500 are returning a record amount of cash to shareholders through dividends and buybacks. Since 2009 dividends have increased by more than 100%, reaching $98 billion in the most recent quarter. Meanwhile, gross buybacks have tripled and Barclays forecasts that they will reach $600 billion in 2016. In fact, buybacks plus dividends could surpass $1 trillion in 2016, for the first time ever.
 Just like Goldman Sachs, Glionna says that "we believe the substantial increase in distributions is one of the primary justifications for the gains in the price of the S&P 500 during this business cycle (Figure 1).
However, this unprecedented surge in distributions may be coming to an end and as Barclays puts it, "alas, nothing continues forever. The growth rate of payouts, which has averaged 20% since 2009, will all but disappear in 2017, in our opinion."
While companies have "taken advantage of a recovering economy and generous credit market to enhance both dividends and buybacks" for six years, they may not be able to push them higher much longer.
And here is a fascinating statistic: over the last few years payouts have exceeded earnings for the S&P 500, which is rare. It almost happened in 2014, when the total payout ratio was 99%. In 2015, it did happen. It will happen again in 2016, based on Barc estimates, as net income is likely to be less than $900 billion against $1 trillion of dividends and buybacks. Prior to 2015, companies in the S&P 500, in aggregate, had paid out more than they earned only six other times during the last 50 years. It has never happened more than two years in a row (Figure 2).
In addition, cash outflows for dividends and buybacks have been exceeding cash flow from operations after capital expenditures. We discussed this in The end of financial engineering? (February 29, 2016), which highlighted the S&P 500’s growing reliance on the investment grade credit market to cover its cash flow deficit. Based on our measure, companies in the S&P 500 have spent more than they generated in free cash flow every year since 2013.
The kicker: Glionna estimates that non-financial companies in the S&P 500 have a cash flow shortfall of more than $115 billion per year (Figure 3). In other words, companies will spend promptly send every single dollar in cash they create back to their shareholders, and then use up an additional $115 billion from cash on the balance sheet, sell equity or issue new debt, to fund the difference.
Why does Barclays believe that 2016 will be the last year with an unprecedented surge in payouts? Two reasons: insufficient cash flow creation, and too much debt to lever up meaningfully higher from existing levels. Here is the full explanation:
For the S&P 500 dividends plus buybacks exceed net income. After funding capital expenditures, dividends plus buybacks also exceed cash flow from operations. This is true even after accounting for equity issuance. But so what? Why can’t companies continue to pay out more than earnings, even if it reduces book value? Why can’t companies continue to spend more than their cash flow if the investment grade credit market is willing to provide cheap financing? We see a compelling reason–leverage ratios will get too high.
Companies have been able to spend more than they generated in cash flow because leverage measures were low coming out of the financial crisis. But they are not low anymore. Since 2013, the total amount of debt owed by non-financial companies in the S&P 500 has increased by almost $1 trillion. Net of cash the increase has been even more meaningful, as the growth rate of debt has exceeded the growth rate of cash and equivalents.
Meanwhile, EBITDA has stagnated. As Figure 4 shows, the median ratio of debt-to-EBITDA for companies in the S&P 500 (excluding financials) was just 1.53x in 2010. Now it stands at 2.33x, the highest point in at least 20 years. The total ratio of debt-to-EBITDA for the S&P 500 (rather than the median ratio) has reached 2.56x, excluding financials. And the increase has not just been caused by the Energy sector. If Energy is excluded in addition to Financials, the total debt-to-EBITDA ratio is 2.50x and it too has been rising rapidly.
As Figure 4 shows, leverage measures are quickly passing key thresholds. The dashed lines represent the median debt-to-EBITDA ratio of companies in the investment grade credit market by rating category. To be sure, the credit rating agencies take many factors into account when setting corporate ratings, but leverage measures such as debt-to-EBITDA are among the most important.
Figure 5 shows the number of companies in the S&P 500 that have a debt-to-EBITDA ratio above 2.5x. It too is increasing rapidly. This is leading to lower coverage ratios, as shown in Figure 6. These trends are unlikely to continue for the same reason why we predicted that IBM's formerly ravenous buyback appetite would grind to a halt: the vast majority of companies in the S&P 500 are investment grade rated and they want to stay that way. Being investment grade brings with it access to cheap, reliable, and plentiful funding. Few investment grade companies, in our opinion, would be willing to adopt a high yield leverage profile just to facilitate buybacks. Therefore, the increase in leverage ratios must soon come to an end.
But, as Barclays notes, the rapid increase in debt-to-EBITDA ratios will not stop unless the growth rate of payouts declines. In other words, if companies keep increasing payouts then debt-to- EBITDA will continue to go up. This is displayed in the sensitivity table shown in Figure 7. In fact, it will take a decline in payouts just to stabilize the S&P 500’s debt-to-EBITDA, based on our estimate of 2% EBITDA growth. While we do not expect payouts to decline this sensitivity table showcases that continued rapid growth is likely unsustainable. The table provides estimates of debt-to-EBITDA measures for the S&P 500 excluding financials based on various growth rates of payouts and EBITDA.
To be sure, there is always the possibility EBITDA will increase faster than expected, allowing more flexibility to add debt. For example, if EBITDA increased by 5% in 2017, which would bring it towards an all-time high, then debt-to-EBITDA would likely stabilize at 2.56x or below.
What the above analysis means, stated simply, is that even assuming no material increase in rates, companies will have no choice but to moderate their aggressive payout practices, the same practices that were instrumental in pushing the S&P to its all time highs. The constraint: balance sheets levered to the gills with record amounts of debt. And unless a new cash flow impulse emerges that sends EBITDA surging, CFOs and Treasurers will cut down on shareholder friendly activities, instead focusing on cash harvesting. This has already been observed in the recent sharp decline in stock buybacks, which however at least for the time being has been offset by an increase in dividends.
As we said, all of the above assumes no increase in rates. However, if as the Fed warns rates are set to rise, however gradually, all of these trends will simply accelerate, resulting in a revulsion toward risk and leading to liquidation of risky assets.
Or, as Barclays would put it, the "party is almost over"
PD1: valoraciones del Mercado:
Y Societe Generale muestra otros muy malos también:
Pero desde el punto de vista macro, el último informe del FMI no es malo. Se mantiene un flojo crecimiento económico occidental, pero se compensa con el buen tono de los emergentes…:
PD2: Los bancos de inversión estadounidenses andan muy cautos sobre el corto plazo: Goldman Sachs espera bajadas en los próximos 3 meses, salvo en el sudeste asiático, y muy pocas subidas en los próximos 12 meses, sobre todo en EEUU, que propone un underweight:
PD3: Y muchos agoreros que hablan de una valoración excesiva y de un posible crash del mercado…
From GMO's Monthly Commentary
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of  foolishness …” 
A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens
While all eyes were on Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen in Jackson Hole, we were watching something else. In August, the Shiller P/E, a well-regarded metric for measuring the valuation of U.S. equities, breached 27. Given that its normal range is something a bit above 16, valuations are looking rather stretched. Further, the last time the Shiller P/E was above 27 was in October … 2007. And we all know how that movie ended.
While nobody here at GMO is saying that a crash is imminent (and there’s no law that says stocks cannot become even more expensive), we continue to maintain our bias against U.S. stocks. We will also take this end-of-summer moment to point out the yawning disconnect between fundamentals (of the U.S. economy and even corporate America) and their stocks. It really is a tale of two cities, one of mediocre fundamentals versus a meteoric rise in markets (see the chart below).
We pulled together some meaningful metrics on the health of the economy and some top-line/bottom-line numbers on the S&P 500 Index: GDP growth, productivity, and household income, as well as a few others, including revenue and earnings for U.S. stocks, for good measure.
It is a tale of mediocrity, at best. Then, we contrasted those with the actual market returns of the S&P 500 Index over the past five years. Truly meteoric. (As an aside, we at GMO have always been leery of drawing too many investment conclusions from staring at economic data—we are more valuation-oriented, after all—but even we are struck by the divergence.)
Which brings us back to the Shiller P/E. Much of the run-up over the past few years has been primarily about multiple expansions. And the scary thing about multiple expansions is that they are reliably mean-reverting—if they run too far, the market always takes it back, sometimes with a vengeance. And we are currently almost 70% too far.
PD4: ¿Creemos los cristianos en la predestinación, como creen otras religiones? ¡No!: los cristianos creemos que Dios nos tiene reservado un destino de felicidad. Dios quiere que seamos felices, afortunados, bienaventurados. Esta palabra se va repitiendo en las enseñanzas de Jesús: “Bienaventurados, bienaventurados, bienaventurados...». «Bienaventurados los pobres, los compasivos, los que tienen hambre y sed de justicia, los que creerán sin haber visto”.
Dios quiere nuestra felicidad, una felicidad que comienza ya en este mundo, aunque los caminos para llegar no sean ni la riqueza, ni el poder, ni el éxito fácil, ni la fama, sino el amor pobre y humilde de quien todo lo espera. ¡La alegría de creer!

13 octubre 2016

diferencias entre los economistas keynesianos y los economistas austriacos

¿En qué se diferencian?
PD1: Son escalofriantes los datos de deuda que acumula el sistema. Lejos de solucionarse el problema de deuda de 2008, lo hemos ido engrandeciendo por momentos… ¿Estamos locos? Tiene pinta. No se arregla una crisis de deuda con mucha más deuda, o imprimiendo papelitos… Esto va a petar, lo malo que, con la patada adelante dada por los bancos centrales, será dentro de varios años y sin previo aviso…
Today we learned from the IMF that World Debt Hits $152 Trillion.
That’s a record breaking amount. It’s also more than two times the size of the entire global economy.
The problem is: It’s simply not enough.
How do I know it’s not enough? Paul Krugman, Larry Summers and other Keynesian economists tell us that.
Not Enough Debt
Paul Krugman tells us Debt is Good.
Krugman says … “Believe it or not, many economists argue that the economy needs a sufficient amount of public debt out there to function well. And how much is sufficient? Maybe more than we currently have. That is, there’s a reasonable argument to be made that part of what ails the world economy right now is that governments aren’t deep enough in debt.”
Too Much Savings
Larry Summers speaks of The Age of Secular Stagnation.
Summers says … “The core problem of secular stagnation is that the neutral real interest rate is too low. This rate, however, cannot be increased through monetary policy. Indeed, to the extent that easy money works by accelerating investments and pulling forward demand, it will actually reduce neutral real rates later on. That is why primary responsibility for addressing secular stagnation should rest with fiscal policy. An expansionary fiscal policy can reduce national savings, raise neutral real interest rates, and stimulate growth.”
There you have it. Despite being $152 Trillion in debt, we actually have too much in savings.
How Much Additional Debt Do We Need?
So, how much debt do we need? It’s hard to say. Perhaps another $200 trillion would be enough. To be safe, perhaps a quadrillion dollars in new debt is necessary.
Then again, perhaps Krugman and Summers are trapped in academic wonderland or some alternate universe.
Those in the real world may wish to consider the distinct possibility debt is the problem, not the solution.
PD2: ¿Le importamos a alguien? Sí, ya sé que a tu mujer, tus hijos y tus padres les importamos bastante. ¿Sólo a ellos? El Señor se encarnó, vino a este mundo a salvarnos, y se dejó matar cruelmente en la cruz por nosotros, por ti y por mí, por todos nosotros, pero no como un conjunto de personas, sino por cada uno de nosotros. Y lo hizo porque nos quería. Su muerte por mí en la cruz me dignifica, me hace especial… Alguien más me quiere aparte de mi parentela y amigos…