31 marzo 2014

31 marzo 2014 ¿Por qué vienen tan pocos turistas chinos a España?

El turismo chino en 2013: 100 millones de turistas salieron de China al resto del mundo. La mayoría, más del 60% fueron a destinos asiáticos, por su proximidad. Sólo el 5% fue a Europa. España recibió casi 180.000 turistas chinos en 2013; París fue visitado por 700.000 turistas chinos el año pasado…¿No habría que hacer algo para pillar a más chinorris? Seguro que sí, seguro que ya lo estamos haciendo y tal…
¿Por qué no fomentamos los lazos comerciales entre China y España? Somos los grandes perdedores ya que los acuerdos de intercambio comercial que no hagas tu, los hacen con nuestra competencia, con Francia y con Alemania…
La diferencia entre nuestros mandatarios y los de otros países es que estos últimos salen al extranjero a vender su país. El Presidente Chino ha estado en Francia para tratar de equilibrar la balanza comercial gala con China que era muy deficitaria. (President Xi trip to France leaves €18.000 M in commercial contracts). Se llegan a compromisos, a acuerdos de intercambio… Obama se va de gira continuamente, no sólo por placer, sino para vender su país, para llegar a acuerdos comerciales…
También ha estado el Presidente chino en Alemania. Y ha publicado esto de sus buenas relaciones comerciales con los germanos: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014xivisiteu/2014-03/28/content_17387815.htm
In recent years, the China-Germany cooperation has led the China-EU cooperation. Each day, the trade in goods between China and Germany accounts for about 1/3 of that between China and the EU which totals US$1.5 billion. Every week, there are over 70 flights connecting more than 10 cities of our two countries. Among the three rail links that have been built between China and Europe, two stretch to Duisburg and Hamburg of Germany respectively. Every year, there are one million tourists traveling between China and Germany. China and Germany have become each other's largest trading partner in Asia and Europe respectively. Furthermore, enterprises of our two countries have made the other country their most important investment destination. Up till now, more than 8,200 German companies and over 2,000 Chinese enterprises have established themselves in each other's country. Our two countries have over 60 dialogue and cooperation mechanisms, including the governmental consultations, strategic dialogue and rule of law dialogue, which have been operating smoothly and have provided a forceful guarantee for continuous progress in China-Germany relations. Our two countries have also increasingly closely coordinated and cooperated with each other in major international issues, such as world peace, regional security, climate change, food security and sustainable development.
A new round of scientific and industrial revolution is just around the corner and countries around the world are trying to adjust or adapt themselves to the development and lose no time in introducing necessary reform measures. Against this backdrop, China has decided to follow the trend of the times, deepen reform comprehensively, and seize the historical opportunity to realize the modernization of the country and the renewal of the nation.
Además, se está construyendo una línea de ferrocarril que une China con Alemania que permitirá el transporte de mercancías entre ambos países.
En España ni lo olemos. Por supuesto que Xi no ha venido a vernos, ¿para qué? Nosotros tenemos a un rey muy mayor que no se mueve, a un heredero que no le dan tanto carrete y a unos presidentes de gobiernos vagos, que no saben de idiomas ni tienen ese don de gentes, ni espíritu comercial alguno, y que delegan en crear una cosa llamada "marca España" para que unos subordinados hagan lo que deberían hacer ellos… Y esto no funciona tan bien. Ser gobernante implica muchos sacrificios, muchos viajes comerciales…, todos estamos siempre vendiendo algo y ellos representan a España como empresa… No sé si ellos, todavía no se han coscado, o prefieren mandar al Margallo y a Carlos Espinosa y cual…
Los gobernantes españoles se dedican a legislar memeces, leyes y más leyes… Es como si en una empresa el director general se dedicara a establecer continuamente normas de funcionamiento, en vez de impulsar el negocio, de hacer actividad comercial. Por culpa de tener 17 reinos de Taifas dentro, se pierde el tiempo atendiendo a los reyezuelos de turno, reuniones y más reuniones, en vez de diseñar un cambio del modelo de crecimiento, o en apoyar a las exportadoras, o impulsar el turismo, nuestro principal negocio, del que nada hacen…
Y sigo indignado porque no ven más allá de un palmo de sus narices. Me cabrea que nos hayamos gastado 65 millones de euros en reformar el Museo Antropológico de Madrid (10.800 millones de las antiguas pesetas). Es un dinero que no tenemos y que no nos podemos permitir, sobre todo con una tasa de paro del 26% y con una crisis de pobreza infantil y energética de aúpa. Sí, ya sé que lo empezó el memo de Zapatero, pero coges y lo paralizas coño, que llevas dos años y medio gobernando, joder! ¿Cuántas más mierdas nos quedan por descubrir? Ese despilfarro de polideportivos, pabellones, obras de Calatrava, autopistas, AVEs (el de Galicia no tienen huevos de pararlo), puentes, M30s (las hay en casi todas las ciudades)… y demás zarandanjas que nos han dejado sin un duro en los bolsillos y con unas deudas que pasaran decenios, muchos, antes de que se puedan pagar… Indignado, cabreado y jodido por mis hijos… Eso sí, a las constructoras se les quita el peso de las radiales y autopistas quebradas, faltaría plus… Constructores y banqueros, qué gente más simpática madre.
No te menciono a Montoro que le viernes nos deleitó con mentiras y más mentiras. Como sabes, no me creo el dato del PIB que considero amañado. Ahora te aseguro que tampoco puedo creerme el dato del 6,62% del déficit público que se publicó el viernes. Si el objetivo era del 4,5% y te lo ampliaron al 6,5%, coño cúmplelo. Según dice, se ha pasado por decimillas, pero parece ser que lo que ha habido es una parálisis de la contabilidad de los gastos públicos desde final de noviembre. Es como si diciembre no hubiera existido, todo se ha pasado a enero… Ay madre. Y este año el objetico es más ambicioso si cabe. ¿Qué haremos, lo pasamos a 2015 como el año pasado? ¡Son unos jetas impresentables! Eurostat se lo va a corregir el 24/4 y les va a sacar los colores. Lo peor, su contento por hacer las cosas tan bien, por hacer tanta austeridad y tal… Es que me descojono o me pongo a llorar. Juegan con la ignorancia del pueblo y con que repetir mentiras y más mentiras sistemáticamente en la prensa se convierten en verdades, y esto no es así, siguen siendo mentiras y se distorsiona la realidad a peor.
Los guiris lo leen:
Spain's budget deficit fell from 6.84% of GDP in 2012 to 6.62% of GDP last year. The budget goal was far less ambitious than previous, but still did not met the commitment to Brussels. The Government has published today the first official public deficit figure for the end of 2013, there will be new reviews in the coming months and a year, but Spain has deviated from the intended target.
Specifically, the government recorded a hole of 6.62% of GDP in 2013 (67.755 billion euros), one tenth of a percentage point above the limit of 6.5% agreed with the European Commission, according to Finance Minister Cristobal Montoro, in a press conference after the Council of Ministers. However, the announced figure does not include the cost of financial aid reported last year (0.46%), so that the actual deficit stood at 7.08% of GDP.
So Much Pain for Virtually No Reward: Happy and content as a lark, Montoro proudly announcing that Spain "almost" met the deficit target. The Spanish public deficit closed at 6.62% of GDP in 2013, slightly more than a tenth above the target of 6.5% agreed with the European Commission (well the first we agreed if I remember correctly was 4.5%) 
Un desesperado abrazo,
PD1: Si quieres entender China en una hora, interesante esto que escribe McKinsey:
Cosas interesantes de esta presentación:
Infraestructuras:
Entradas y salidas de dinero:
Creando una clase media:
PD2: Desde el Financial Times habla el prestigioso Martin Wolf sobre China que creo es muy interesante:

China's struggle for a new economy

Beijing clearly recognises the need for action –the question is whether corrective forces overwhelm its efforts
What are the prospects for the Chinese economy? Few, if any, economic questions can be more important. I have just attended this year's China Development Forum in Beijing, which brings western business leaders and scholars together with senior Chinese policy makers and academics, with this question very much in my mind.
Outside China, pessimism has been growing about the ability of the colossus to sustain its rapid growth. Worriers are paying particular attention to excessive capacity, investment and debt. I share the view that making the transition to slower and more balanced growth is an extraordinarily hard challenge even by the standards of those China has already met. Yet betting against the success of Chinese policy makers has been a foolish wager. When a superb horse meets a new obstacle, the odds must be on the horse. But even the best horse may fall.
Yang Weimin, a vice-minister in the government, laid out the country's new "guidelines for comprehensively deepening reform" in an invaluable background paper. This notes several new conditions.
First, China is an upper-middle-income country, with gross domestic product per head of $6,700. It is now tackling the rarely achieved task of becoming an advanced economy.
Second, the international environment is less favourable than it used to be, partly because the high-income economies are so structurally weak and partly because the Chinese economy has become so much larger relative to all others.
Third, the economy has itself changed. The potential growth rate has fallen to 7-8 per cent, partly because of a shrinking labour force; excess capacity has become massive even by Chinese standards; financial risks have risen, driven by excessive local authority borrowing, housing bubbles and growth of shadow banking; the country is now more than 50 per cent urbanised but its cities suffer a range of ills, including pollution. Finally, the resource-intensive growth pattern is hitting limits, notably of water, which is not a directly tradeable commodity.
The "Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms" agreed last November is the response. It is the blueprint for the next round of reforms. It proposes, notably, substantial institutional and political reform, including a transformation of "imperative and administrative governance" to "governance by law". The market is to play a "decisive" role in resource allocation. The government is, in turn, to be responsible for "macroeconomic regulation, market regulation, public service, social administration and environmental protection". Westerners would recognise all that.
This implies changes in the role of state-owned enterprises. It also implies a shift from positive to negative lists of what new entrants are allowed to do: instead of needing approvals, businesses should be able to do whatever is not prohibited. This might prove revolutionary. Also important are proposed changes to the system of residence permits, which should allow 100m migrants to become permanent urban residents.
To most outsiders the language of official declarations is mind-numbing. Yet, having listened to Premier Li Keqiang and vice-premier Zhang Gaoli, I found all this at least analytically convincing. They clearly recognise the need for decisive action in response to the challenges faced. What they want to do also makes good sense both on economic and environmental fronts.
A background paper on medium-term economic prospects and a presentation by Stephen Roach, now at Yale, show that China has also made real progress in its transition towards a slower, less resource-intensive and more employment-intensive pattern of economic growth. While the services sector has a significantly smaller share in GDP than in almost all other economies, for the first time it became bigger than industry's in 2013. Before 2008, a percentage point of growth produced fewer than 1m new urban jobs. Since then each point has produced an average of 1.4m jobs. Inflation has remained well under control and industrial profitability has held up despite slower growth.
In all, the economy seems to have been adjusting quite smoothly to the inevitable slowdown driven by a declining ability to exploit untapped resources, including labour.
Yet China also has a highly unbalanced economy whose most striking feature is the extraordinarily low share of consumption, public and private, and extraordinarily high share of investment (both close to half of GDP). Until last year, in which there was a small reversal, the rise in the investment share had been rapid and almost continuous since the start of the present century.
At present, private consumption is about 35 per cent of GDP, roughly half the share in the US. The extraordinary share of investment has driven growth. But it is also directly related to the growth of excess capacity and the rise in leverage. As the paper on medium-term prospects notes, the outstanding risks to economic performance do indeed lie in the related risks of financial panic, imploding property bubbles, high local government debt and excess capacity. The peril is that a rapid correction would cause a positive feedback loop and so a far sharper than expected economic slowdown.
In many important industries, output is already below 75 per cent of capacity. Yet China is far too large to export its way out of this. In the case of steel, for example, its annual capacity is 1bn tons and output 720m, 46 per cent of the global total. A significant slowdown in infrastructure and property investment would devastate capacity utilisation in steel. The same is true for cement. Bad debt would soar.
The big question now is whether the corrective forces in the economy could overwhelm the ability of the authorities to manage the needed adjustments smoothly.
Some might argue that a crash is precisely what is needed. The authorities will disagree and so, which matters not at all, do I. They also have many levers under their control. Nonetheless, the downside risks from financial stress and macroeconomic adjustment have been rising sharply. I plan to assess the scale of the risks and possible responses next week.
PD3: China se suma al carro de los parques de atracciones. Por ahora gana a nivel mundial DISNEY, que sigue con un tirón descomunal y con cifras exuberantes…, pero ya verás como los chinos quieren potenciar su turismo interno construyendo lo mismo que tienen los demás países.
Lo raro es que España no sale. Recuerdas los fiascos que nos costaron una millonada: Time Warner en Madrid…, y los demás. Perdimos nuestra oportunidad con Eurodisney, que se lo llevaron los gabachos…
PD4: China tiene muchas reservas y es muy fuerte económicamente hablando
Today's breathless China headline: "Chinese Yuan's Drop Is Largest Since Its 2005 Currency Revaluation." Yesterday's headline was even more breathless: "China Currency Plunges Most In Over 5 Years, Biggest Weekly Loss Ever." Reading these headlines, you'd be tempted to think that China was in trouble, but you'd be very wrong.
Here's the "plunge" in the value of the yuan from a big-picture perspective:
That's right, you can barely see the "plunge" when you look at  a long-term history of the yuan. Since its all-time high of 6.04 in mid-January, it has dropped a mere 1.7%, to 6.1415. The big story in China continues to be the yuan's impressive strength, not its weakness: it's up 42% vis a vis the dollar in the past 20 years.
And it's not just the yuan appreciating against the dollar. It has appreciated against every currency in the world, and in inflation-adjusted terms as well. As the chart above shows, the real value of the yuan against a large basket of currencies has appreciated by a staggering 85% in the past 20 years. Only the yen has a better record of long-term appreciation: it rose 250% against the dollar from 1970 through 1994 (from 350 yen per dollar to 100).
Spectacular gains in Chinese productivity—which have boosted the size of China's economy by 8-10% per year for the past 20 years—are the main reason the yuan has appreciated. Capital has poured into China, eager to finance and profit from China's impressive progress.
To accommodate the huge increase in the size of China's economy, the Chinese central bank had to expand the Chinese money supply by orders of magnitude. They did this in a very prudent fashion, by buying almost $4 trillion of the capital inflows that China has received over the years. These purchases provided a solid foundation (in the form of an expansion of China's foreign reserves—see chart above) for a necessary expansion of the amount yuan in circulation. (Think of the growth of China's foreign exchange reserves as a proxy for net capital inflows.) Yet even though it bought trillions of dollars with newly-created yuan, the central bank allowed the yuan to appreciate. In a sense, they didn't buy enough dollars and euros, and that created an effective shortage of yuan which could only be resolved via a yuan appreciation.
But as the chart above also shows, China's accumulation of reserves has slowed down significantly over the past few years. That's because the central bank has liberalized capital flows, and the strong appreciation of the yuan has brought China's costs more into line with costs overseas, with the result that the economy has cooled off. With capital inflows "tapering" off, there is much less pressure for the yuan to appreciate. The central bank is correct in allowing (and even encouraging) the yuan to trade more freely. The yuan was on a one-way street (appreciating) for the past 8-9 years, and that can't go on forever. Looking ahead, it's likely that the yuan will bounce around in a relatively stable channel, rather than constantly appreciating. This new perception alone could help reduce capital inflows and avoid any unnecessary or unwarranted "overheating" of the economy.
For the past 15 years or so, Chinese inflation has been very similar to U.S. inflation, as the chart above shows. But since the yuan appreciated against the dollar by about 37% over this same period, Chinese prices effectively rose by roughly that amount relative to U.S. prices. This has made China somewhat less competitive, and that has worked to slow its growth on the margin. But it's still growing by at least 7% a year. And the central bank still has almost $4 trillion of reserves, which makes the yuan potentially the most rock-solid currency on the planet. What's not to like about a growing economy and a strong currency and low inflation?
PD5: Las valoraciones de los mercados emergentes en bolsa están muy atractivas, aunque no hay flujo de fuera hacia ahí… ¿Llegará ese flujo este año? ¿Ha empezado ya? Puede…
PD6: Esperanza no es tener confianza en el día de mañana, si no que es confiar en que Dios, HOY, nos provee y nos mima. No debemos estar siempre inquietos por el día de mañana… Como decía Víctor Hugo: "¡Oh! ¡Mañana es la gran cosa! ¿De qué estará hecho el mañana?". Pues no es eso, es el hoy lo más importante. Cumplir con el deber de hoy y no estar pendiente del mañana. ¡Qué bueno es Dios que nos tiene escondido el porvenir! Dios nos dará nuevas fuerzas para las dificultades del mañana. No podemos dejar todo amarrado para el mañana, ya que siempre habrá algo imprevisto… Hay que confiar en la providencia de Dios y no obsesionarnos con que lo hacemos todo con nuestras fuerzas, si no que es Dios quien actúa…