Muy interesante lo que dice este hombre. Alemania nos ha dado tiempo. Si hubiéramos caído habríamos quebrado toda su banca. Pero ese tiempo puede que no sea suficiente y que tengamos que ordenar y reducir el volumen de nuestras cuantiosas deudas, reconociendo nuestra incapacidad de pagarlas. No dejes de leerlo, es lo que nos va a pasar a España en unos pocos meses/años…, habrá que reestructurar nuestra deuda, con unos efectos perniciosos sobre muchas inversiones que tengamos.
El exceso de deuda impide el crecimiento
«Lo único que ha hecho que en España no haya habido suspensión de pagos ha sido la garantía de Alemania»
En el cuarto año de la crisis de 1837, antes de ser un país unido bajo un gobierno central, dos tercios de los estados americanos, entre ellos varios de los más ricos, suspendieron el pago de su deuda externa. Estados Unidos sobrevivió. Si la Unión Europea pretende sobrevivir, va a haber que encontrar una solución a la deuda europea. Cuanto más esperemos, más probabilidades hay de una ruptura permanente del euro y de la Unión Europea.
Madrid, en un gesto más de fe que basado en datos económicos o históricos, nos asegura que con las reformas adecuadas a la larga logrará salir de su deuda. Todos los países que se han enfrentado a crisis de deuda han hecho la misma promesa, pero ésta casi nunca se ha cumplido. El exceso de deuda en sí impide el crecimiento e, incluso sin la camisa de fuerza del euro, España probablemente no podrá solventar su deuda.
Incluso quienes están en contra de condonar la deuda reconocen que lo único que ha hecho que en España no haya habido suspensión de pagos ha sido la garantía de Alemania, escudada tras el Banco Central Europeo. Señalan que como el sistema bancario alemán no podría sobrevivir a la suspensión de pagos de tan siquiera un país, a Berlín no le queda otra que avalar la deuda española eternamente. Se equivocan. A pesar de sus detestables políticas, los partidos de extrema derecha de toda Europa están prosperando más que nada porque proteger el euro y los bancos europeos genera enormes costes para las clases trabajadora y media.
Suspensión de pagos en España
Con su ataque a Europa lo que estos extremistas explotan es el rechazo de los dirigentes europeos a reconocer sus errores. Cuanto más dure la crisis económica, mayores son sus posibilidades de ganar, de que se produzcan suspensiones de pago en países y de que se acabe Europa. Pero la deuda española resulta insostenible incluso sin extremismos. Lo que evitó la suspensión de pagos en España y otros países fue tan sólo la promesa del Banco Central Europeo en 2012 de hacer «lo que fuera necesario» para proteger el euro. Pero mientras la deuda siga creciendo más rápido que el PIB en toda Europa, la carga del Banco Central Europeo aumenta inexorablemente mes tras mes. Llegará un momento en que la creciente deuda y un debilitamiento de la economía alemana pondrán en peligro la credibilidad de la garantía del Banco Central Europeo (que no servirá para nada) -poco a poco al principio y repentinamente más adelante. En cuestión de meses se producirá la suspensión de pagos en España.
Es más, la predisposición de Alemania a pagar la deuda no es permanente. Para proteger sus bancos, Berlín está jugando el mismo juego que Washington desplegó en América Latina en los 80. Mientras que el pago de la deuda continúa aplazándose, los bancos alemanes están reforzando capital para protegerse de la suspensión de pagos que muchos en Berlín vaticinan. Salvar los bancos implica tácitamente transferir riqueza de Alemania y de los hogares europeos (transferir, ¿a dónde? ¿Quiere decir extraer?), o abiertamente a través de impuestos o, lo que es más fácil desde un punto de vista político, manipulando a escondidas las tasas de interés. Es lo que sucedió durante la crisis de Latinoamérica. Los bancos estadounidenses reforzaron activamente su capital, principalmente a costa (de manera encubierta) de los hogares de los estadounidenses de a pie, mientras que insistían en que los países de América Latina lo que necesitaban era más reformas y no la condonación de la deuda. Pero las múltiples reformas llevaron de todos modos a unas tasas de desempleo elevadísimas y a una enorme inestabilidad social en toda la región.
Para 1987-88, cuando los bancos estadounidenses tenían por fin capital suficiente, Washington reconoció finalmente que el pago total de la deuda era imposible y en 1990 los bancos estadounidenses perdonaron la deuda externa de México, y en los años siguientes la de casi todo el resto de países. Como viene sucediendo a lo largo de la historia, fue solo entonces cuando Latinoamérica comenzó por fin a crecer.
En España tiene que suceder lo mismo. Los bancos alemanes y europeos tienen que reforzar su capital, pero van a ser necesarios muchos años más antes de que lo consigan. Solo entonces, después de que España sufra un desempleo sin sentido y un tremendo daño social, Berlín «descubrirá» que Europa necesita la condonación de la deuda.
Incluso si salvar los bancos mereciera tanto esfuerzo, la elección no depende exclusivamente de España. La declaración de insolvencia de pequeñas economías como la de Chipre y Grecia casi hundió el sistema. Si Portugal, Francia, Italia u otro país deciden no pagar, el pánico que esto generaría llevaría de todas maneras a España a la crisis. Cada país de Europa tiene que estar dispuesto a pagar el coste de proteger los bancos o si no se hundirán todos los países juntos.
Pagar dos veces
La historia nos ha dejado claro que el coste del pago de la deuda será enormemente alto y que de todas maneras es probable que se produzca una crisis de deuda. Esto quiere decir que la gente normal tiene que pagar dos veces: una a modo de transferencias encubiertas que refuerzan el capital y otra, con una alta tasa de desempleo y erosión social, y en la mayoría de los casos no obtiene ninguna de las ventajas porque de cualquier modo la crisis se produce.
Para evitar que esta trágica historia se repita, España tiene que debatir la deuda abierta honestamente y debe decidir democráticamente si proteger los bancos europeos le merece muchos años más de dificultades. Quizás sí que merezca la pena este precio para evitar la suspensión de pagos, pero tenemos que ser conscientes de que la historia indica que, por mucho que luchemos, la crisis se producirá de todos modos.
EE.UU. cometió muchos errores (entre ellos, una guerra civil) antes de convertirse en un solo país con una moneda única, enfrentándose a la oposición de quienes estaban en contra de la unión; sin embargo, la genialidad de su sistema permitió que reconociera sus errores y realizara ajustes. No hay motivos por los que Europa no pueda reconocer que impuso el euro de una manera insostenible y realice los ajustes necesarios. Si no lo hace, los ganadores más probables serán los partidos extremistas que quieren ponerle punto y final a la UE
Abrazos,
PD1: Si el Estado no tiene superávit primario (ingresos menos gastos sin intereses), como va a devolver la inmensa deuda pública que tenemos? Como en 1998-2007: no devolviendo nada y simplemente refinanciando. El crecimiento PIB lo resolvió, pero ahora el crecimiento es muy tibio y el volumen de deudas es descomunal. El problema es que no tenemos modelo alternativo al de la burbuja. Que creceremos al 1,5%-2% durante una década en el mejor de los casos. Vamos a vivir una crisis a la japonesa.
Ingresos y deuda
Los votantes de los países endeudados ya se han cansado y la estabilidad social está amenazada
Siete años de crisis, más de un billón de deuda pública y España tiene un sistema de seguimiento de cumplimiento de las cuentas públicas impropio de un país de 32.000 dólares por habitante. La información que se publica es de las partes, pero no tenemos la del todo. La Administración central está adulterando sus datos de ingresos con atípicos procedentes de emitir bonos a tipos de interés por debajo de su cupón. Pero eso es una pura anotación contable que no mejora el dinero disponible en la caja para pagar sueldos de funcionarios, pensiones e intereses de la deuda.
Los ingresos de la Administración central, eliminando ese efecto, crecen un 4% anual y están inflados por ingresos ocasionales que se registraron en el primer trimestre del año y que no volverán a producirse en el futuro. Los ingresos de la Seguridad Social están estancados y los de las comunidades autónomas caen próximos al 1%. La realidad es que los ingresos públicos totales crecen el 1,5% anual en los primeros nueve meses de 2014. Estamos obsesionados con el PIB pero lo determinante en la crisis de deuda es la recaudación.
La bajada de prima de riesgo, sobre todo a corto plazo, ha frenado la dinámica de insostenibilidad de deuda. Pero el coste implícito de la deuda pública está próximo al 4%. Para conseguir estabilizar el ratio de deuda pública sobre PIB el gobierno debería conseguir un superávit primario (diferencia entre ingresos y gastos antes del pago de intereses) del 2,5% del PIB, la diferencia entre el crecimiento de ingresos y el coste de la deuda. España cerrará 2014 con un déficit primario próximo al 3% del PIB. Por lo tanto, el gobierno tendría que hacer un ajuste fiscal adicional del 5,5% del PIB, o sea 55.000 millones de euros para retornar a la senda de sostenibilidad. Pero eso es un análisis puramente contable. Con un multiplicador fiscal, por muy bajo que se elija, este ajuste provocaría caída de PIB y empleo. Lo que nos enseña la teoría económica y la historia reciente es que los inversores volverían a dudar de recuperar su dinero invertido en deuda española y tendríamos otra crisis financiera, intensificando el crecimiento del pago de intereses.
La solución más razonable es aumentar el crecimiento, la inflación y el crecimiento de los ingresos fiscales. Esto es lo que ha hecho EE UU desde 2009 y tiene la tasa de paro en el 6% y el déficit público acabará 2014 próximo al 3% del PIB. Pero la negación de la realidad de los gobernantes europeos y españoles nos aleja de la solución. El relato oficial es que los bancos son solventes, que la deflación es expansiva, que la solución es más austeridad, más competitividad, o sea más bajada de salarios, y que hay margen para bajar los impuestos.
Pero hay dos variables que los gobiernos no controlan: la estabilidad social y los votos de los ciudadanos y los mercados. Los votantes de los países endeudados ya se han cansado y la estabilidad social está amenazada. Y los mercados empiezan a ponerse nerviosos. Aún hay tiempo, aunque cada vez menos, para un diagnóstico realista, un debate europeo serio sobre la deuda y un cambio de rumbo de la política económica. Pero parece que nuestros gobernantes seguirán malgastando el tiempo, mientras la deuda crece exponencialmente
PD2: En todas partes habrá poco crecimiento… ESTANCAMIENTO (stagnation) Está todo hecho y no hay dinero para invertir en más…
The notion that Europe and other advanced economies are suffering secular stagnation is gaining traction. This column by Larry Summers – first published in the Vox eBook “Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures” – explains the idea. It argues that a decline in the full-employment real interest rate coupled with low inflation could indefinitely prevent the attainment of full employment.
Just seven years ago all seemed well in the field of macroeconomics. The phrase 'great moderation' captured the reality that business cycle volatility seemed way down from levels of the first part of the post war period. A broad methodological consensus supported the use of DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models to understand macroeconomic fluctuations and to evaluate macroeconomic policies. There was widespread support for the idea that the primary concern of independent central banks should be maintaining appropriate inflation targets and reacting to cyclical developments to minimise the amplitude of fluctuations.
Economic crisis has led to crisis in the field of macroeconomics. The idea that depressions were a concept of only historic interest has been belied by the financial crisis and “Great Recession”. Figures 1a and 1b depicts the gap between actual and potential output estimated as of various dates for both the US and the Eurozone. It is apparent that output is far short of where its potential was expected to be as of 2008. Even more troubling is the observation that most of the gap is expected to represent a permanent loss as potential output has been revised sharply downwards. For the Eurozone, GDP is almost 15% below its 2008-estimated potential and potential output has been written down by almost 10%. As Figure 2 illustrates Europe’s output shortfall is almost identical to the one Japan experienced when the bursting of its ‘bubble economy’ triggered a financial crisis.
Figure 1a. Actual and potential GDP in the US
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Figure 1b. Actual and potential GDP in the Eurozone
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Databases, Bloomberg
Figure 2. Japan and Eurozone, forecast vs. reality
Sources: OECD 1992 “Long Term Prospects For The World Economy”, IMF 2007, 2007 & 2014 WEO Database
The experience of Japan in the 1990s and now that of Europe and the US suggests that – for the purpose of understanding and combating important fluctuations – theories that take the average level of output and employment over a long time period as given are close to useless. Unfortunately almost all work in both the New Classical and New Keynesian tradition has focused on the second moment (the variance) of output and employment. This thinking presumes that with or without policy intervention the workings of the market will eventually restore full employment and eliminate output gaps. The only questions go to the volatility of output and employment around their normal levels. What has happened in the last few years suggests that the second moment is second-order relative to the first moment – the average level of output and employment through time.
The “new secular stagnation hypothesis” responds to recent experience and the manifest inadequacy of conventional formulations by raising the possibility that it may be impossible for an economy to achieve full employment, satisfactory growth and financial stability simultaneously simply through the operation of conventional monetary policy. It thus provides a possible explanation for the dismal pace of recovery in the industrial world and also for the emergence of financial stability problems as an increasingly salient concern.
Plan
This column focuses on the idea of secular stagnation. After noting the apparent difficulty that industrial economies are having in achieving financially stable growth with full employment, I explain why a decline in the full employment real interest rate – FERIR, for short – coupled with low inflation could indefinitely prevent the attainment of full employment. I argue that even if it were possible for the FERIR to be attained, this might involve substantial financial instability. Having made the case that a decline in the FERIR would explain much of what we observe, I then adduce a variety of factors suggesting that the FERIR has declined substantially over the last several decades in the industrial world. I conclude by discussing the relationship between the secular stagnation and hysteresis, global aspects and policy implications.
1. The secular stagnation hypothesis and recent events
It has now been more than 5 years since the US economy reached its trough in the second quarter of 2009 and close to 5 years since evidence of systemic financial risk as reflected in LIBOR spreads or the need for government bailouts or elevated risk premiums on bank debt has been pervasive. Yet US economic growth has averaged only 2% over the last 5 years despite having started from highly depressed state. In a similar vein, credit spreads in Europe have come way down and fears of the dissolution of the Eurozone have been sidelined, yet growth has been glacial over the past several years and is not expected to rapidly accelerate.
Upon reflection, these patterns should be surprising. If a financial crisis represents a kind of power failure one would expect growth to accelerate after its resolution as those who could not express demand because of a lack of credit were enabled to do so.
Trouble masked by unsustainable finances
Unfortunately it appears that the difficulty that has arisen in recent years in achieving adequate growth has been present for a long time but has been masked by unsustainable finances. Here it is instructive to consider the performance of the US and Eurozone economies prior to onset of financial crisis in 2007. Start with the United States.
It is certainly fair to say that growth was adequate perhaps even good during the 2003-2007 period. It would not be right to say either that growth was spectacular or that the economy was overheating during this period. And yet this was the time of vast erosion of credit standards, the biggest housing bubble in a century, the emergence of substantial budget deficits and what many criticize as lax monetary and regulatory policies.
Imagine that US credit standards had been maintained, that housing had not turned into a bubble and that fiscal and monetary policy had not been simulative. In all likelihood output growth would have been manifestly inadequate because of an insufficiency of demand. Prior to 2003, the economy was in the throes of the 2001 downturn and prior to that it was being driven by the internet and stock market bubbles of the late 1990s. So it has been close to 20 years since the American economy grew at a healthy pace supported by sustainable finance.
Making judgments for Europe is more difficult because of the problem of evaluating structural constraints on growth. But in retrospect it is clear that much of the strength of the economies of the periphery prior to 2010 was based on the availability of inappropriately cheap credit and that much of the strength of the economies of Northern Europe was derived from exports that were financed in unsustainable ways.
Understanding anaemic growth absent unsustainable financing
How might one understand why growth would remain anaemic absent major financial concerns? Suppose that a substantial shock took place – for reasons that I will describe subsequently – and that this tended to raise private saving propensities and reduce investment propensities. How would growth be affected? The normal answer to this question is that one would expect interest rates to fall (driven either by market forces or policy actions) until the saving and investment rate were equated at the full employment level of output. That is to say, changes in saving and investment propensities, or for that matter, in government deficits might be expected to impact an economy’s FERIR but not its level of output and employment. But this presupposes full flexibility of interest rates. In fact, in modern economies short term safe interest rates cannot fall appreciably below zero because of the possibility of currency substitution. So interest rates are not fully flexible in modern economies. Note that interest rates that include term or credit premia will never fall to zero but only to a level that reflects these premia.
Hence the possibility exists that no attainable interest rate will permit the balancing of saving and investment at full employment. This is the secular stagnation hypothesis first put forward by Alvin Hansen in the 1930s. Notice that as Keynes, Tobin and subsequently Brad Delong and I have emphasized, wage and price flexibility may well exacerbate the problem. The more flexible wages and prices are, the more they will be expected to fall during an output slowdown leading to anincrease in real interest rates. Indeed there is the possibility of destabilizing deflation with falling prices leading to higher real interest rates leading to greater output shortfalls leading to more rapidly falling prices and onwards in a vicious cycle.
Low rates and financial instability
Even if the zero interest rate constraint does not literally bind, there is the possibility that the positive interest rate consistent with full employment is not consistent with financial stability. Low nominal and real interest rates undermine financial stability in various ways. They increase risk taking as investors reach for yield, promote irresponsible lending as coupon obligations become very low and easy to meet, and make ponzi financial structures more attractive as interest rates look low relative to expected growth rates. So it is possible that even if interest rates are not constrained by the zero lower bound, efforts to lower them to the point where cyclical performance is satisfactory will give rise to financial stability problems. Something of this kind was surely at work during the 2003-2007 period.
2. What has happened to the FERIR?
So far I have argued that if the FERIR declined substantially one might expect to see an unfortunate combination of unsatisfactory cyclical performance and financial instability, much like what has been observed recently. Is it reasonable to suppose that FERIR levels have declined in major industrial countries? A variety of structural changes summarized in Summers (2014) suggest that FERIR levels may have declined substantially. These include:
+ Slower population and possibly technological growth means a reduction in the demand for new capital goods to equip new or more productive workers.
Throughout the industrial world levels of labor force growth are way down with labor force shrinkage already under way in Japan and soon to come in large parts of Europe.
+ Lower priced capital goods means that a given level of saving can purchase much more capital than was previously the case.
Information technology continues to decline rapidly in price and to account for a larger share of total capital investment. It is revealing that the iconic cutting edge companies have traditionally needed to go the market to support expansion. Today leading edge companies like Apple and Google are attacked for holding on to huge cash hoards.
+ Rising inequality operates to raise the share of income going to those with a lower propensity to spend.
Closely related a rising profit share operates to transfer income to those with a lower propensity to spend.
+ Increasing friction in financial intermediation associated with greater risk aversion in the wake of the financial crisis and increased regulatory burdens operates to raise the wedge between safe liquid rates and rates charged to borrowers.
In general equilibrium this drives down safe rates. The same effect is present if debt overhangs or increased uncertainty discourages borrowing.
+ A rising desire on the part of central banks and governments to accumulate reserves coupled with conservative investment strategies operates to raise the demand for safe assets driving down safe interest rates.
This effect is reinforced by requirements that encourage pension funds and insurance companies to hold their assets in safe bonds as to best match liabilities.
+ Ongoing disinflation which means that at any given real interest rate, real after-tax interest rates are higher.
To the extent that it is after-tax real interest rates that matter for investment decisions (as for example with tax deductible mortgages), this operates to shift investment demand inwards, resulting in a pretax real interest rate lower than it was before.[1]
Evidence from FERIR estimates
The importance of these considerations is suggested by the available empirical evidence on actual real rates and on estimates of the FERIR. Figure 3 shows trends in indexed bond yields for a number of countries. It is clear that they have trended down over the last 15 years. Even more relevant for the US economists at the Fed, Laubach and Williams (2003) have attempted to estimate the FERIR – using data on actual real interest rates and measures of where the economy is relative to its potential. While many issues can be raised with respect to their calculations, Figure 4 illustrates their estimate of a substantial long term decline in the FERIR.
Figure 3. World average real interest rate
Sources: Mervyn King “Measuring the World Real Interest Rate”
Figure 4. US natural rate of interest
Sources: Thomas Laubach and John Williams “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest”
The IMF in its most recent World Economic Outlook has examined trends in real interest rates in industrial countries and has also considered a variety of factors bearing on real rates. They have reached conclusions similar to the ones I have reached here – that the FERIR has likely declined in recent years. This observation, together with the observation that lower US inflation – and in Europe declining rates of inflation – make it more difficult than previously to reduce real interest rates. This in turn suggests that the zero lower bound and secular stagnation are likely to be more important issues in the future than in the past. At a minimum the analysis suggests that if full employment is to be maintained in the years ahead, real interest rates in the industrial world will likely be lower than they have been historically – a development that may have important implications for financial stability.
3 Conclusions and implications
The case made here, if valid, is troubling. It suggests that monetary policy as currently structured and operated may have difficulty maintaining a posture of full employment and production at potential and that if these goals are attained there is likely to be price paid in terms of financial stability. A number of questions come to mind:
+ How great are the risks?
Alvin Hansen proclaimed the risk of secular stagnation at the end of the 1930s only to see the economy boom during and after World War II. It is certainly possible that either some major exogenous event will occur that raises spending or lowers saving in a way that raises the FERIR in the industrial world and renders the concerns I have expressed irrelevant. Short of war, it is not obvious what such events might be. Moreover, most of the reasons adduced for falling FERIRs are likely to continue for at least the next decade. And there is no evidence that potential output forecasts are being increased even in countries like the US where there is some sign of growth acceleration.
+ What about Hysteresis?
On their own, secular stagnation ideas do not explain the decline in potential output that has been a major feature of the experience throughout the industrial world. The available evidence though is that potential output has declined almost everywhere and in near lockstep with declines in actual output; see Ball (2014) for a summary. This suggests a way in which economies may equilibrate in the face of real rates above the FERIR. As hysteresis theories which emphasize the adverse effects of recessions on subsequent output predict, supply potential may eventually decline to the level of demand when enough investment is discouraged in physical capital, work effort and new product innovation.
Perhaps Say’s dubious law has a more legitimate corollary – “Lack of Demand creates Lack of Supply”. In the long run, as the economy’s supply potential declines, the FERIR rises restoring equilibrium, albeit not a very good one.
+ What about global aspects?
There is important work to be done elucidating the idea of secular stagnation in an open economy context. The best way to think about the analysis here is to treat it as referring the aggregate economy of the industrial world where – because of capital mobility – real interest rates tend to converge (though not immediately because of the possibility of expected movements in real exchange rates). If the FERIR for the industrialized economies were low enough one might expect capital outflows to emerging markets which would be associated with a declining real exchange rates for industrial countries, increased competitiveness and increased export demand. The difficulty is that this is something that emerging markets will accept only to a limited extent. Their response is likely to be either resistance to capital inflows or efforts to manage currency values to maintain competitiveness. In either case the result will be further downward pressure on interest rates in industrial countries.
4.What is to be done?
Broadly to the extent that secular stagnation is a problem, there are two possible strategies for addressing its pernicious impacts.
+ The first is to find ways to further reduce real interest rates.
These might include operating with a higher inflation rate target so that a zero nominal rate corresponds to a lower real rate. Or it might include finding ways such as quantitative easing that operate to reduce credit or term premiums. These strategies have the difficulty of course that even if they increase the level of output, they are also likely to increase financial stability risks, which in turn may have output consequences.
+ The alternative is to raise demand by increasing investment and reducing saving.
This operates to raise the FERIR and so to promote financial stability as well as increased output and employment. How can this be accomplished? Appropriate strategies will vary from country to country and situation to situation. But they should include increased public investment, reduction in structural barriers to private investment and measures to promote business confidence, a commitment to maintain basic social protections so as to maintain spending power and measures to reduce inequality and so redistribute income towards those with a higher propensity to spend.
References:
Summers, Lawrence (2014). “U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound”, Business Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, National Association for Business Economics.
Laubach, Thomas and John C. Williams (2003). “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest ”, Review of Economics and Statistics 85(4), 2003, pp 1063-1070
PD4: Yo me voy todos los años a uno. Si te quieres venir conmigo, lo pasaremos bien y rezaremos mucho. Házmelo saber. Pero si prefieres irte por tu cuenta, me parece que van a ser muy interesantes unos que predica el Obispo Munilla de San Sebastian. Te coges el coche y a tratar de ser algo mejor…
