A pesar del rebote, seguimos con muchas dudas. Es el problema de financiación el que corroe a España. No hay dinero para financiar nada. Los bancos cogen la pasta del BCE pero no la circulan y no se espera un cambio ni a corto, ni a medio plazo. Las CCAA tiesas dependientes del Estado y sus préstamos. Las cajas de ahorros sobreviven con el FROB, la mora sigue galopante ya que no hay actividad ni rebote alguno en el mercado inmobiliario… No hay nada de confianza en el futuro de nuestra economía. Y los guiris, que lo saben, se largan. Sacan la pasta de España los inversores financieros extranjeros y los nacionales a través de recomendaciones de la banca privada que les llevan las perras a otros sitios (Luxenburgo…):
Massive Jump in Bank of Spain Borrowing from ECB
Inquiring minds are digging into Consolidated Balance Sheet of the ECB and by the Bank of Spain, searching for clues about the LTRO program for the entire Eurozone and also for Spain in isolation.
Consolidated Balance Sheet of Eurosystem
Net Lending to Credit Institutions
During March alone, the LTRO expanded by 433.236 billion but main refinance operations shrank by 87.821 billion. In March alone, 301.424 billion was parked right back with the ECB.
Please consider Spain.
Consolidated Balance Sheet of Banco De Espana
ECB system-wide lending in March went up by 39.690 billion euros.
ECB lending to Bank of Spain alone jumped by 75.168 billion euros.
Thus, lending shrank by 35.478 billion euros elsewhere. What did Spanish banks do with the money? They parked it in sovereign bonds are now underwater on the purchases.
If you were looking for specific details as to why CDS rates for Spain hit an all-time high, there you have it.
PD1: Así se hace un iPad. Se fabrica en China por la empresa Foxconn. Dos minutos que te cuentan cómo se hace. Interesante ver lo poco mecanizado de la fabricación. Es más sencillo poner a los chinitos que tienen unos sueldos de mierda a fabricarlos que no montar una cadena de producción robotizada que los haga. Y lo alucinante es que la calidad es un éxito. Funcionan, no dan problemas. No será que el hombre trabaja mejor que la maquina. Ni a tiros… Qué miedo. Después de ver el video ya no miro igual a mi iPad…
PD2: Si el bonos español suben del 6,5%, volverán a haber compras masivas por parte del BCE, a pesar del consenso que se produjo tras el LTRO1 y el LTRO2 (los paquetes de dinero al 1% a tres años realizados por el BCE hace pocos meses para que los bancos fueran los que compraban los bonos soberanos que nadie quería y que no podía seguir comprando el BCE) de que se acababa la intervención del BCE en sujetar el mercado de bonos públicos.
Si el bono español llega al 7,5% habrá otro LTRO3. Si hace falta habrá otro LTRO4 en junio y otro LTRO5 en julio y otro LTRO6 en agosto y así sucesivamente…Ahora sabemos que habrá más vueltas a la maquinita de hacer dinero, muchas vueltas, todas las vueltas que haga falta…:
At least that is the bogey according to JPMorgan's Pawan Wadhwa, who in a note announced that the ECB may resume SMP purchases if the 10 year hits 6.5% (as in a few hours), much to the chagrin of Germany, which was foosed into believing LTRO 1+2 would mean no more SMP purchases. More importantly, since the 6.50% barrier will be taken down with impunity in days if not hours, and the SMP has proven time and again to be powerless to prevent mass selling, the next big bogey is 7.50% at which the ECB will likely announce another 3-year Discount Window bazooka, pardon, LTRO. What JPM does not say is that with the halflife of each successive LTRO getting cut in half, LTRO 4 will be needed in June, LTRO 5 in July, LTRO 6 in July, LTRO 7 in July and so on. Most importantly, now that banks, who are desperate for some cash infusion from either the Fed or the ECB, know what the critical threshold bogey for action is, they will be sure to facilitate the ECB's life, and send Spanish 10 Years plunging to at least 7.50% and demand Draghi play ball, again. In other words: now that the market knows what the consensus is to get more European QE, it will promptly do it. After all the LTRO was never for the benefit of the countries: it was always and only to benefit Europe's insolvent banks. If that means "Greecing" Spain in the process, so be it.
PD3: Más desde fuera de España…según dice el FT:
Spain has accepted mission impossible
By Wolfgang Münchau
Are the markets panicking because Spain may fail to hit its deficit targets, or are they panicking at the thought that Spain may succeed? That, to me at least, is the key question facing eurozone policy makers. The ultimate outcome of the eurozone crisis will depend to a large extent on how that question is answered.
News coverage seems to suggest that the markets are panicking about the deficits themselves. I think this is wrong. The investors I know are worried that austerity may destroy the Spanish economy, and that it will drive Spain either out of the euro or into the arms of the European Stability Mechanism.
The orthodox view, held in Berlin, Brussels and in most national capitals (including, unfortunately, Madrid), is that you can never have too much austerity. Credibility is what matters. When you miss the target, you must overcompensate to hit it next time. The target is the goal – the only goal.
This view does not square with the experience of the eurozone crisis, notably in Greece. It does not square with what we know from economic theory, or from economic history. And it does not square with the simple though unscientific observation that the periodic episodes of market panic about Spain have always tended to follow an austerity announcement. One such episode came with the discussion that led to the recently introduced draft budget, which included a deficit correction of 3.2 per cent of gross domestic product for 2012. When Mariano Rajoy, Spain's prime minister, began to outline the deficit cuts for 2013 last week, the markets panicked again and drove Spanish 10-year yields back to 6 per cent. The targeted fiscal adjustment amounts to 5.5 per cent of GDP over a period of two years. It is one of the biggest fiscal adjustments ever attempted by a large industrial country. It is perfectly rational for investors to be scared.
European policy makers have a tendency to treat fiscal policy as a simple accounting exercise, omitting any dynamic effects. The Spanish economist Luis Garicano made a calculation, as reported in El País, in which the reduction in the deficit from 8.5 per cent of GDP to 5.3 per cent would require not a €32bn deficit reduction programme (which is what a correction of 3.2 per cent would nominally imply for a country with a GDP of roughly €1tn), but one of between €53bn and €64bn. So to achieve a fiscal correction of 3.2 per cent, you must plan for one almost twice as large.
Spain's effort at deficit reduction is not just bad economics, it is physically impossible, so something else will have to give. Either Spain will miss the target, or the Spanish government will have to fire so many nurses and teachers that the result will be a political insurrection.
The wider eurozone crisis was caused by financial flows from banks in the core countries, which financed bubbles in the periphery, except in Greece. Spain may also have a dysfunctional labour market and fixing it may still be highly desirable. If this is a good moment to do it politically, then so be it. But we should not fall for the illusion that structural reforms are going to make a big difference. Austerity and reform are not the magic combination policy makers believe them to be.
Fixing the Spanish crisis will have to start with the banks – and this is a task the private sector is not willing, and the government not able, to perform. The only halfway benign solution I can see would involve a European rescue programme for Spain that focuses specifically on the recapitalisation and downsizing of the financial sector. Spain would also need to undershoot the eurozone's average inflation rate over many years to redress some of the lost price competitiveness. At the same time, the country needs to go easy on austerity.
That combination of policies might just work, though it would still be difficult. What is not going to work is a combination of deflation, austerity and private sector deleveraging, all at the same time, for a decade.
But it will be tried – of that there can be little doubt. The EU will resist an ESM programme for as long as possible. The eurozone finance ministers fear that any such programme might reopen the debate about the size of the ESM, a debate they want to avoid at all costs. But as the recession gets worse, and Spanish unemployment rises towards 30 per cent, the pressure for Spain to turn to the ESM will grow. It will happen eventually. And even when that happens, it will not end the crisis in Spain. For that a eurozone-wide bank resolution system would also be necessary.
I can see only two outcomes for Spain. The crisis will end either in a catastrophic Spanish withdrawal from the eurozone, or in a variant of a fiscal union that includes a joint eurozone backstop to the financial sector. If the Spanish government pursues the strategy it has announced to the bitter end, the first outcome will become vastly more probable.
PD4: Te he recomendado no tener inversiones en España, ni acciones de nada (aunque las hayas tenido toda la vida), ni depósitos bancarios. Ponte en el peor de los casos, ponte en que suframos en un momento determinado un corralito… Ya sabes mi afición por los emergentes, es lo mejor que debes tener ahora. Las otras alternativas con las grandes corporaciones de EEUU. Por si te animas a invertir en las grandes multinacionales americanas, que sepas que hay vida aparte de las Telefónicas de siempre, de las Santander, de los BBVA, de las Repsol y demás gaitas locales…Las mayores empresas de EEUU y su evolución este año (recuerda que el Ibex lleva un palme del 15% de media):
PD5: Mis clientes me dicen que soy un cenizo, que digo cosas muy poco positivas. Y mira que yo no me veo tan negativo… Hace muchos meses estuve algo "depre" pensando que no había solución alguna y que íbamos irremediablemente a un gran fiasco. Ahora sé que vamos a un fiasco, pero no me preocupa tanto. Todo el mundo lo sabe ya, y esto me tranquiliza. Lo que me incordiaba antes era pensar que era yo sólo el que sabía que no había luz al final del túnel. Ahora sé que lo sabe todo quisqui. Ya no hay información privilegiada, ya no soy yo sólo el que tiene este mal pálpito. Ya somos muchos los que sabemos que nos la estamos dando… Por tanto, cada uno debe apechugar con las consecuencias de sus actos. Esto es lo que me da paz, saber que ya no tengo responsabilidad por avisar al público de lo que se nos avecina.
¿Cuánto tardaremos en caer? Puede que mucho, puede que poco… Nos va a dar igual. El listo, el que deje sus medidas de precaución para el último segundo me recuerda a aquellos cristianos que, sabiendo el mensaje del Señor, deciden esperar para seguirle a saberse en sus últimos días de la vida… Quieren disfrutar de los placeres de la vida, sin perderse nada. Frenesí total…, pensando en ellos mismos. Buscarán el último segundo para ponerse a bien con Dios. Pues como en economía, el último segundo no sabemos cuándo será… Debemos estar preparados. Y no pienses que los que sí seguimos a Cristo todos los días nos estamos perdiendo nada. Al revés, estamos ya en el cielo…
